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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is a worker's compensation case appealed from the Idaho Industrial Comm ission
(hereinafter the "Commission").

Appellant Mario Ayala (hereinafter " Ayala" or "claimant")

appeals from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Commission dated April
9, 2018 (hereinafter "20 18 Order") which found: (1) that claimant failed to prove that his low
back condition was causally related to his 2009 accident and is therefo re not entitled to benefits
for that condition; (2) that claimant is not totally and pem1anently disabled under the odd-lot
doctrine; and (3) that claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person inclusive of
impairment due to his 2009 and 2013 industrial accidents.

B.

Course of Proceedings

On November 16, 20 12, claimant filed two Complaints. The first alleged that on October
6, 2009, he injured his cervical spine, left upper extremity, right upper extremity and low back
while employed by Robert J Meyers Farms, Inc. (hereinafter "Employer") R., pp. 1-3. The
second alleged that on October 14, 200 1, he injured his low back working for Employer. R. , pp.
407-408. In both Complaints, claimant alleged entitlement to medical treatment for his lovv back.
In his 2009 Complaint, he alleged entitlement to additional impairment for his low back and
benefits for total and permanent disability. R., pp. 1-3. In their Answers, Employer and Idaho
State Insurance Fund (hereinafter " Surety") (collectively referred to as "defendants") denied any
liability for claimant' s alleged lumbar spine injury and for total and permanent disability

benefits. R. , pp. 4-5; 409-410. On May 24, 2013, the Commission consolidated the Complaints.
R. , p. 9. Thereafter, on March 28, 2014, the Commission consolidated these two cases with a
third Complaint alleging an accident dated August 28, 2013 causing an injury to claimant's right
knee filed on January 24, 2014. R., pp. 9; 411-413. On April 25, 2016, claimant filed a Motion
to Enforce an alleged February 17, 2016 settlement agreement between the parties. R. , pp. 16-24.
On June 7, 2016, the Commission denied claimant' s Motion to Enforce. R., pp. 36-38.
On October 26, 2016 Referee Michael Powers held a hearing on several issues, including:
(1) whether claimant's lumbar spine condition was due to a pre-existing condition or was not
work-related; (2) his entitlement to disability in excess of impairment; (3) whether claimant was
totally and permanently disabled pursuant to odd-lot doctrine; and (4) attorney' s fees.

R. , p.

130. On April 9, 2018, the Commission entered its seventy (70) page 2018 Order finding that
claimant: (I) failed to establish his low back condition was causally related to his 2009 accident
and was not entitled to benefits; (2) failed to establish that he was totally and permanently
disabled under the odd-lot doctrine; (3) suffered disability of 40% of the whole person inclusive
of his impairment; and (4) was not entitled to an award of attorney' s fees. R., pp. 129-199.
On April 25, 2018, claimant filed several motions including a Motion for
Reconsideration, a Motion to Reopen, Motion for Modification of Award, and a Motion for
Consolidation. R., pp. 207-229. In his Motion for Consolidation, claimant sought to consolidate
his 2009 and 2013 claims with a June 7, 2017 industrial accident causing a left knee injury. R. ,
pp. 228-229.

On June 22, 2018, the Commission entered an Order on Motion for
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Reconsideration, Modification and Consolidation denying all of claimant' s post-award motions.
R., pp. 279-302. Claimant timely appealed.

C.

Statement of the Facts

1. Claimant's October 6. 2009 Motor Vehicle Accident.
Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident on October 6, 2009. The parties agree
that the claimant suffered injuries to his cervical spine, left shoulder and left ulnar nerve.
Following his accident, he went to the Elmore Medica l Center where he had no recorded
complaints of low back pain. Claimant's Exhibit (hereinafter "Cl. Ex ...) 4, pp. 144 - 148. Due to
neck pain with radiation into his left arm, claimant was referred to neurosurgeon Dr. Peter Reedy
who treated him on January 8, 2010. At that time, Dr. Reedy documented complaints of neck
and left arm pain. Cl. Ex. 5, p. 150. The claimant indicated that if he "stands for 20-25 minutes
his legs go numb." Id.

Claimant's gait was normal.

Id. at p. 151. Dr. Reedy performed a

cervical fusion on February 19, 2010. Cl. Ex. 5, p. 155. Following surgery, Dr. Mark Hanis
evaluated claimant at the request of defendants on August 2, 2010. Claimant's chief complaint
was decreased range of motion and pain in his neck and left arm. Claimant told Dr. Hanis that
he had left leg symptoms that ·'have now resolved and has no further concerns about that area."
Cl. Ex. 20, p. 603. On June 20 l 0, Dr. Reedy released the claimant to return to work in hi s time
of injury position with no restrictions. Cl. Ex. 27, p. 695. On November 18, 2010, Dr. Reedy
released claimant from his care. Cl. Ex. 20, p. 164.
On December 9, 20 10, Dr. Clawson and Dr. Hessing perfonned two procedures on
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claimant: a left ulnar nerve neurolysis and a left shoulder arthroscopic surgery with subacromial
decompression and rotator cuff repair. Cl. Ex. 8, pp. 421 , 424-427. On January 11, 2011. Or.
Clawson released the claimant to return to work without restriction. Id. at p. 434. On April 20,
2011, Dr. Hessing opined that the claimant was fixed and stable and had a 5% upper extrem ity
impairment rating. Id. at p. 446. He released the claimant to return to work without rest riction
on May 3, 2011. Id at p. 447. In April 20 11 , Dr. Clawson and Or. Hessing each approved the
claimant's job site evaluation and released claimant to return to his job with no restrictions. Cl.
Ex. 27,pp. 704-706, 710.
On August 15, 2011, claimant returned to Dr. Harris for a final impairment rating for his
cervical spine, left shoulder and ulnar neuropathy of his left elbow. Dr. Harris rated the
clai mant's combined impairments at 9% of the whole person. Cl. Ex. 20, p. 617. Dr. Harris
opined that claimant should " use caution in overhead activities, although no pen11anent
restrictions were given or suggested." Id. at p. 618.
2. Claimant ·s August 28. 2013 Right Knee Injury and Subsequent Treatment

On August 28, 2013, Claimant fell off an 8-foot ladder landing on his feet causing
extreme pain in his right knee. Cl. Ex. 12, p. 493. Dr. Miers Johnson treated claimant. On
September 11, 20 13, Dr. Johnson documented claimant was working full duty without restriction
at the time of his accident. C l. Ex. 13, p. 496. Dr. Johnson documented claimant had low back
pain radiating into both interior thighs with numbness and tingling down the legs on an
occasional basis. Id. Dr. Johnson perfon11ed a right total knee arthroplasty on May 6, 2014. Id. at
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pp. 514-517. On September 22, 2014, Dr. Johnson released the claimant to full duty work with
no restrictions.

Id. at, p. 525.

On October 6, 2014, Dr. Shoemaker rated the claimant's

impairment at 4% of the whole person due to his knee replacement noting that the claimant had
returned to full duty work status. Cl. Ex. 14, p. 53 8.
On September 1, 2015, claimant went to his personal physician Dr. Ensminger
complaining of left knee pain. Claimant told Dr. Ensminger that his artificial right knee was
"doing well." Cl. Ex. 16, p. 563. Claimant also told Dr. Ensminger that he had been doing a Jot
of work bent over or kneeling during the harvest.

Claimant's right knee was nom1al on

examination. Id. at p. 566.
On September 25, 2015, claimant underwent a FCE at the request of his counsel. Cl. Ex.
23.

Claimant's primary diagnosis was a lumbar spine injury with secondary diagnoses of

cervical spine surgery, shoulder surgery, elbow surgery and knee surgery.

Id. at p. 646.

According to the therapist's testing, claimant's uninjured extremities' grip strength, range of
motion and leg strength were worse than his injured extremities.

Id. at pp. 649-650; 652.

Claimant was limited in lifting, elevated acti vity, bending, standing activities. crouching,
kneeli ng, sitting and climbing stairs. The therapist apportioned the extent to which these
restrictions were attributable to his low back vis-a-vis his other body parts. Id. at p. 647.
On August l , 2016, at the request of his counsel, claimant saw neurologi st Dr.
Hammond. Dr. Hammond reported regarding claimant's shoulder and ulnar neuropathy. ..he has
been left with minimal residual f rom these ailments." Cl. Ex. 24. p. 659a (emphasis added).
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With respect to his right knee, claimant said it ''feels good, has no pain and actually worh better

than his left." Id. (emphasis added). With regard to the Claimant' s left shoulder, Dr. Hammond
stated it "feels well and occasionally is stiff, but he can do pretty much everything he wants with

this." Id. (emphasis added). Claimant had no difficulty with grip or using his left arm or hand
other than a little bit of numbness in his palm. id. His chief complaint was significant low back
pain. Id. at p. 659c.

3. Claimant 's Low Back Treatment Pre and Post October 6, 2009
Claimant's documented history of low back pain began in May 2007 when he told Dr.
Booth that he had right hip and SI pain for two years. Cl. Ex. 20, p. 629. On September 9, 2009,
PA Vern McCready at Glenns Ferry Health Clinic (hereinafter "GFHC") treated claimant due to
a chief complaint of back pain in the upper mid and low back which had an abrupt onset for
approximately one week. Cl. Ex. 3, p. 136. Claimant had muscle spasms that were mild and
located at his vertebra. Id. at p. 137. Mr. Mccready prescribed a one-month supply of Flexeril
and Naprosyn. Id. at p. 138. One day prior to his accident, on October 5, 2009, Mr. McCready
diagnosed Claimant with obesity, asthma and back pain. Id. at p. 143. Claimant reported having
back pain, joint pain and stiffness. PA McCready prescribed a one-month supply of Naprosyn.
Id at p. 141.

Following the claimant's October 6, 2009 accident, he sought treatment at GFHC. He
specifically denied having back pain on November 4, 2009, November 16, 2009, November 30,
2009 and December 11, 2009. Cl. Ex. 3, pp. 196, 206, 208 and 211. On Apri l 7, 2010, claimant
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reported having no tenderness over his spine or SI joints, he had full spine range of motion
without pain and negative straight leg raises on both sides. Id. at p. 218. The claimant first
reported having back pain to his personal physician on June 21 , 20 I0. At that time he reported
that he had back pain "which is new" and located in his mid-right back. Id. at p. 225. On July 21 ,
2010, he reported having mid back pain of one-month duration. Id. at p. 231.
On December 1, 2011 claimant informed PA McCready that he was suffering from
lumbar pain that began "two weeks ago." Cl. Ex. 3, p. 288 (emphasis added). The pain was
moderate and radiated into his right and left legs. Claimant reported the "onset of the back pain

was gradual and began without a clear precipitating event." Id. (emphasis added).
At the request of Dr. Reedy, claimant had a myleogram of his lumbar spine on April 3,
2012. The rad iologist stated it showed "no significant lateralizing mass effect." Cl. Ex. 1 L p.
489. Dr. Paul Montalbano testified that this signified that there was no compression of the nerve
root; therefore claimant was not a surgical candidate. Montalbano depo., p. 65, II. 14-25. A post
CT myelogram of his lumbar spine showed lumbar spondylosis resulting in severe bilateral L5S 1 foraminal stenos is, moderate bilateral L4-5 foraminal stenosis and multilevel mild canal and
foram inal stenosis elsewhere. Cl. Ex. 11 , p. 491.

On August 7, 2012, Dr. Michael Hajjar

recommended lumbar fusion surgery. Cl. Ex. 10, p. 471.
On August 30, 2012, Surety asked Dr. Harris if claimant' s complaints of low back pain
were related to his 2009 motor vehicle accident. Cl. Ex. 20. pp. 631-632. On September 21,
2012, Dr. Harris opined that claimant' s low back problems were not related to his October 6,
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2009 accident. Cl. Ex. 20, pp. 629-630. He noted that claimant did not indicate he had a low
back problem on a medical exam questionnaire or a pain diagram he filled out on July 31, 2010.

Id. at p. 629. Dr. Harris noted claimant had documented pre-existing low back pain in September
2009 and May 2007 and opined that his low back pain was not causally related to his October
2009 accident. Id. at p. 630.

In April 20 13, defendants' counsel asked Dr. Montalbano to review claimant's medical
records and provide an opinion regarding causation of claimant's low back complaints. Cl. Ex.
20, p. 637. Dr. Montalbano provided a verbal opinion that based upon medical records the
claimant's low back complaints were not related to his industrial accident in 2009. Montalbano
depo., p. 6, 11. 12-16.
In October 20 14, Dr. Montalbano became claimant' s treating physician upon referral by
Dr. Johnson fo r an evaluation of claimant's low back and lower extremity symptoms. Id. at p. 7,
II. 1-12. On October 15, 2014, Dr. Montalbano performed a physical exam ination that was
normal except the claimant had an antalgic gait and positive straight leg raise. Cl. Ex. 17, pp.
569-570; Montalbano depo., p. 9, 11. 10-19. Dr. Montalbano recommended an MRI and x-rays to
rule out canal stenosis or nerve root compression instability. Id. at p. 11 , 11. 2-4.
Claimant underwent a post myelo CT and x-rays on October 22, 2014. Dr. Montalbano
reviewed the actual films. Cl. Ex. 19, pp. 590-594; Montalbano depo., p. 11 , II. 15-22. Dr.
Montalbano noted that the x-rays showed anterolisthesis at L4-5 , which was grade one related to
arthritis of his facet joints. Id. at p. 12, 11. 1-4. The post myelo CT showed arthritis of the facet
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joints and neuroforaminal naITowing secondary to the facet issues. Id. at p. 12, 11. 5-9. Dr.
Montalbano testified that based upon his review of these films although there was lateral recess
stenosis at 14-5 and 15-S 1 there was no evidence of nerve root compression or central canal
stenosis to explain claimant's symptoms. Id. a p. 12, L. IO - p. 13, L. 6.
Dr. Montalbano reviewed the 2012 films taken of the claimant' s lumbar spme and
compared these to the 2014 films.

He testified there was no progression of the underlying

arthritic condition in his lumbar spine, no change in instability and no change in the lateral recess
stenosis.

He added that there was no evidence of nerve root impingement to explain the

claimant's leg symptoms. Id. at p. 14, L. 5-p. 15, L. 6.
In February 2015, Dr. Montalbano recommended a bone scan because he was looking for
an inflammatory condition to explain claimant's pain. It showed mild increase uptake involving
a right L4-5 and L5-S 1 facet joints due to arthritis but not a surgical condition. Id. p. 15, L. 10-p.
16, L. l. The scan did not explain claimant' s low back pain. Id. at p. 16, II. 14-18.
On April 8, 2015 , claimant's musculoskeletal exam was normal including reflexes,
sensory exam and strength; but he still had a painful gait. Cl. Ex. 17, p. 573. A neurologic exam
was normal including reflexes and sensation. Montalbano depo., p. 16, L. 23-p. 17, L. 6. Dr.
Montalbano then recommended a right L4-5 facet injection to determine if it was his pain
generator. Id. at p. 17, II. 7- 14. On May 6, 2015, the claimant underwent a facet injection with
little improvement so Dr. Montalbano concluded the right L4-5 joint was not claimant's pain
generator. Dr. Montalbano testified that the claimant's facet issue was a degenerative arthritic
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condition not caused by trauma. Id. at p. 18, ll. 11-25. Dr. Montalbano recommended physical
therapy and a weight reduction program because claimant was morbidly obese and his
deconditioning and hi s body habitus caused his low back pain. Id. at p. 19, II. 8- 15.
On June 3, 20 15, after undergoing physical therapy. claimant saw Dr. Montalbano. He
was much improved. His gait and station were normal, and hi s back pain had improved. Id. at p.
20, 11. 1-17. Dr. Montalbano opined that the claimant's back pain was due to his body habitus
and deconditioning. Id. at p. 2 1, II. 2-7. Claimant was not a surgical cand idate because his
symptoms did not correlate to imaging studies, his bone scan was normal and there was no
evidence of nerve root compression. Id. at p. 21 , II. 8-18.
On July 8, 20 15, Dr. Montalbano, after receiving a " limited amount"' of medical records
from Mr. Berry, authored a letter ind icating that claimant' s motor vehicle accident was the
source of his low back pain because Dr. Montalbano thought claimant was asymptomatic before
the accident. Cl. Ex. 17, p. 576; Montalbano depo., p. 23, L. 18-p. 24, L. 2. Dr. Montalbano
then received a complete set of the claimant's medical records incl uding his September 9, 2009
and October 5, 2009 appointments. Cl. Ex. 2 1, p. 640. Since claimant complained of back pain
before hi s motor vehicle accident Dr. Montalbano noted the claimant was not asymptomatic.
Montalbano depo., p. 26, 11. 11-20 Dr. Montalbano thus opined on October 3, 2015 that the
claimant' s symptomatology was due to the degenerative cond ition of his spine and that he had
only suffered a lumbar strain as a result of his accident which had resolved. Cl. Ex. 21, p. 639.
On January 6, 2016, defendants' counse l provided Dr. Hajjar with medical records
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documenting claimant' s complaints of back pain prior to his accident. Cl. Ex. I 0, p. 472c. On
January 27, 2016, Dr. Hajjar agreed with Dr. Montalbano' s assessment that the claimant's motor
vehicle accident did not cause his current low back symptomology. He stated " at the present
time, based upon Mario's history, any issue related to that accident has ran its course a long time
ago." He added that he believed that the "causation question was fairly clear that Mr. Ayala had
a pre-existing condition causing back pain which was not exacerbated in any meaningful way
from the car accident that occurred on October 6, 2009." Cl. Ex. I 0, pp. 472a-472b. Shortly
thereafter, claimant's counsel submitted a four-page letter to Dr. Hajjar requesting his opinion
regarding causation. Cl. Ex.IO. pp. 472g - 472j. On February 19, 2016, Dr. Hajjar changed his
opinion because he felt that claimant's prior treatment for back pain sounded " more like a flulike
illness or viral prodrome versus any type of mechanical back issues." CL Ex. l 0, p. 472f. .
In a post-hearing deposition, Dr. Montalbano opined claimant had low back pain due to a
pre-existing condition, i.e., degenerative arthritis accentuated by morbid obesity. He testified
claimant showed no evidence of a traumatic injury to his spine due to his motor vehicle accident.
Montalbano depo., p. 29, II. 24-30. He disagreed with Dr. Reedy' s opinion that the motor
vehicle accident caused or aggravated his pre-existing condition. Dr. Montalbano explained that
claimant was symptomatic prior to his motor vehicle accident, he had no complaints of lower
extremity symptoms for several months following his accident and he denied having low back
pain on several occasions following his motor vehicle accident as documented by claimant' s
GFHC medical records. Id. at p. 31 , 11. 1-19.
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4. Testimony and Opinions of Nancy J. Collins. Ph.D.
Claimant hired Dr. Collins to provide an opinion regarding the extent of his disability.
Dr. Collins opined that due to claimant' s 2009 and 2013 accident and the results of the FCE that
claimant was totally disabled. Collins depo., p. 17, 11. 6-12. She explained claimant' s past work
is heavy to very heavy and his current FCE restrictions are for limited light work. Cl. Ex. 32, p.
848. She based her opinion on her understanding that claimant cannot perform hi s job he did
before his injuries by working longer hours, delegating and super human effort to make sure the
work is done. She felt that he was not competitively employable with his restrictions and that
without accommodation and a sympathetic employer he would not qualify for any job that exists
in his labor market. Id. at p. 851.
Dr. Collins admitted that the objective medical evidence that she considers are " the
restrictions that (the treating physicians) provide when they are medically stationary." Collins
depo. , p. 59, 11. 4-8. She acknowledged that none of the claimant's treating physicians imposed
any restrictions at the time he was medically stable. Id. at p. 59, II. 9-16. Dr. Collins admitted
that her statement in her report that claimant' s treating physicians did not make specific
restrictions for the avoidance of any physical activity "except as tolerated" was not supported by
the medical records. Id. at p. 60, II. 3-15 . She admitted that if the claimant had no restrictions
then he has no disability. Id. at p. 62, 11. 12-22. She acknowledged that if claimant represented
to his doctors that he was able to do his regular job without restriction following his automobile
accident he is not totally and permanently disabled. Id. at p. 89, 11. 16-24. She also adm itted she
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did not know whether his treating physicians imposed restrictions or gave him releases to return
to work based upon the information Mr. Berry provided her. Id. at p. 94, II. 10-24.
With regard to claimant' s ability to obtain employment in the Mountain Home and
Bruneau area based solely on nonmedical factors, she admitted that she did not know how many
jobs would be available. Id. at p. 73 , L. 10 - p. 74, L. 16. She did not know how many frontline
farm supervisor positions were available or existed in his labor market. Id. at p. 75 , II. 1-6.

5. Testimony and Opinions of William C. Jordan

Mr. Jordan prepared an employability report on February 2, 2016. Def. Ex. 9, pp. I 90214. Mr. Jordan testified that the claimant is a very valuable employee for the Employer because
he knows the equipment; how to balance the water pumps so that they operate correctly; how to
run the large pivots; and how to repair the pivot, pump and irrigation equipment. Jordan depo.,
p. 18, L. 19-p.19, L. 18.

He noted the claimant also operates farm equipment and helps

coordinate the harvest, including supervising two to three people. id. at p. 19, L. 19-p. 20, L. 7.
Claimant told Mr. Jordan that he is able to lift 50 pounds of seed, push a grocery cart,
bend and stoop and use a cherry picker for lifting. Id. at p. 22, L. 8-p. 24, L. 16. Based upon hi s
knowledge of the farms in the area where claimant worked, Mr. Jordan indicated that ranch
hands and farm laborers in their sixties are not doing the heavy aspects of the work because they
are too old to physically handle it. Id. at p. 25 , II. 2-9.
Mr. Jordan considered that the Employer indicated that claimant was a good worker, he
was a foreman of the farm and that he supervised two other employees. Mr. Meyers indicated
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the claimant still does the same job tasks after his accidents, but he goes about it a little
d ifferently and that they planned to keep him around. id. at p. 38, L. 11-p. 40, L. 12. Mr.
Meyers indicated claimant possessed institutional knowledge about how to draw water using the
pumps and operating the pivots for irrigating which has to be managed and balanced. He also
talks to the chemical distributors for fertilizer and pest control. id. at p. 41 , IL 9-25.
Mr. Jordan also contacted other employers in the area on October 14, 20 16 to determine
if claimant would be employable considering his skills. One farmer indicated that there wou ld
be an employment market for an individual such as claimant who is sixty-four, Hispanic,
bi lingual, and possess the background in repairing and operating waterline systems and proper
watering of large acreages. Id. at p. 46, 11. 1-22. Mr. Jordan opined that the claimant had either
no disability due to the full releases from his physicians or a 47% disability inclusive of
impairment using the results of the FCE (including low back complaints). Def. Ex. 9, p. 173.

ARGUMENT
A.
There is Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support The
Commission's Finding That Claimant Failed to Meet His Burden of Proving
That His Lumbar Condition was Causally Related to His 2009 Accident.
The initial issue the Commission decided was whether claimant's low back complaints at
the time of hearing in October 2016 were causally related to his October 6, 2009 motor vehicle
accident. The resolution of this issue impacted claimant' s alleged entitlement to further medical,
impairment and disability benefits. As the Commission noted, and as should be readily apparent
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to this Court, the parties devoted reams of exhibits, expert testimony and arguments on this issue.
In fact, the parties' failure to agree to the resolution of this issue caused the need for the hearing
as the parties thought they had settled the disability issues prior to hearing but could not agree on
this medical causation issue. R. , p. 18; 2018 Order, 168, R., p. 168. In analyzing this issue, the
Commission recognized that "the objective medical evidence must be correlated with the
Claimant' s history and clinical examination to inform an opinion on whether or not the subject
accident did cause some permanent injury to Claimant's lumbar spi ne." 2018 Order, ,[68, R. , p.
169.
The Commission then ruled in favor of defendants on this issue stating:
Having reviewed the record in its entirety, and having considered
the writings and testimony of all the physicians who have rendered
an opinion on the cause of Claimant' s low back condition, the
Commission concludes that Claimant has failed to demonstrate, to
a reasonable degree of medical probability, that his cunent low
back complaints are causally related to the subj ect accident.

2018 Order, 170, R., p. I 69. As is shown below, there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the Commission's finding.

1. Standard of Review
When the Supreme Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it reviews
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the
Commission's findings.

Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996).

Medical causation is generally a question of fact which will not be disturbed on appeal where
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there is substantial and competent evidence to support it. Reyes v. Idaho Supreme Potatoes, l 3 3
Idaho 385, 387-388, 987 P.2d 297, 299-300 (1999). Substantial and competent evidence is
"relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."

Boise

Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund (In re Wilson), 128 Idaho 161 , 164, 911 P.2d 754,
757 (1996).

However, all facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to

defendants herein as they prevailed before the Commission. Jordan v. Dean Foods, 160 Idaho
794, 798, 379 P.3d 1064, 1068 (2016). This Court will not re-weigh the evidence or consider
whether it would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Excell Contr..

Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 692, 116 P.3d 18, 22 (2005). This Court will not
disturb the Commission's findings on the weight and credibility of the evidence unless those
conclusions are clearly erroneous. Shubert v. Macy 's W , Inc.. 158 Idaho 92, 98,343 P.3d 10 99,
1105 (2015) abrogated on other grounds by Chavez v. Stokes, 158 Idaho 793, 353 P.3d 414
(20 15). While the terms of Idaho's workers' compensation statute are liberally construed in favor
of the employee, "conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker. "

Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 755, 302 P.3d 718, 723 (2013).
2. Claimant 's Burden to Establish Causation
The permanent aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable under Idaho' s
workers' compensation law. Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Company, Inc. , 99 Idaho 312,
581 P.2d 770 (1978). An employee may be compensated for the aggravation or acceleration of a
preexisting condition, but only if the aggravation results from an industrial accident as defined
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by Idaho Code§ 72-102(17). See, Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren ldgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho I 29,
132, 879 P.2d 592, 595 (1994). Claimant has the burden of proving that his low back condition
is causally related to his 2009 industrial accident. Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 Idaho
309,317,336 P.3d 242, 250 (2014).
T he level of proof required for showing causation is "a reasonable degree of medical
probability.... " Anderson v. Harper's Inc. , 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006).
When causation is at issue, the Commission's role is "to determine the weight and credibility of
testimony and to resolve conflicting interpretations of testimony." Henderson v. McCain Foods.

Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 565, 130 P.3d 1097, 1103 (2006).

"The Commission may not decide

causation without opinion evidence from a medical expert." Serrano, 157 Idaho at 317, 336 P.3d

at250(quotingAnderson, 143 Idaho at 196, 141 P.3dat 1065).
In this case, the Commission was asked to resolve the conflicting and often vacillating
opinions of Dr. Harris and Dr. Montalbano (who opined that the claimant's low back condition
was not causally related to his industrial accident) and Dr. Hammond, Dr. Reedy, Dr. Hajjar and
PA Vernon McReady as to whether claimant's low back condition was caused 2009 accident.
As the factfinder, the Commission is free to determine the weight to be given to the testimony of
physicians. Fife v. Home Depot, Inc. , 151 Idaho 509, 514, 260 P Jd 1180, 1185 (20 I I). In
resolving this conflict in favor of the defendants, the Commission relied on claimant's numerous
objective medical records in an attempt to correlate the medical causation opinions with the
claimant's history, clinical presentation and examinations.

17

As is shown below, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
Commission's finding that based upon the testimony of Dr. Montalbano and the objective
medical records, the "record better supports the proposition that claimant suffered from periodic,
but not unrelenting, low back and lower extremity discomfort between October 6, 2009 in the
late fall of 2011, just as he suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain in the years prior to
October 6, 2009 .. . For these reasons, claimant failed to establish that his low back condition is
causally related to the subject accident." 2018 Order, 1 77, R., pp. 175-176.
3. The Commission 's Finding is Supported by The Record and Expert Opinions

Claimant's argument that his motor vehicle accident either caused or aggravated his low
back pain is based upon two false premises: (1) that his back pain before his accident was due to
the flu rather than his pre-existing condition (he was asymptomatic) and (2) that following his
accident he had persistent unrelenting low back and leg pain. The Commission analyzed these
arguments and rejected both of them, as the record did not support them.
As the Commission properly noted, the radiological studies establish claimant has
multilevel degenerative disease of the lumbar spine that predated his accident. 2018 Order, 171 ,
R. , p. 169. Claimant's medical records also document prior low back pain in May 2007 and
again on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, the latter only one day prior to his accident.
Cl. Ex. 20, pp. 601,629; Cl. Ex. 3, pp. 138-143.
In an apparent attempt to minimize the significance of his pre-existing low back pain,
claimant argued that on September 9 and October 5, 2009 his pain complaints were due to a
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systemic complaint such as the flu as opposed to musculoskeletal low back complaints. Thus, he
argues he was asymptomatic prior to his accident. Dr. Hammond based his causation opinions,
in part, upon his belief that the claimant' s back pain in September and October 2009 were due to
the flu while his current complaints were caused by a structural abnormality. 2018 Order, ~ 59,
R., p. 164; Hammond depo., p. 17 L. 18 - p. 21 , L. 17. Dr. Hajjar opined on February 19, 20 16
that claimant' s low back pain was caused by his motor vehicle accident because he felt that the
claimant' s treatment for back pain in September and October 2009 sounded "more like a tlulike
illness or viral prodrome versus any type of mechanical back issues."

Cl. Ex. 10, p. 472f.

Finally, Dr. Reedy based his causation opinion on his assumption that the claimant was
"asymptomatic until the time of the MV A which precipitated the need for intervention.'' Cl. Ex.

5, p. 177.
Dr. Montalbano' s opinions illustrate the significance of whether claimant' s pre-exi sting
degenerative disease of his lumbar spine was asymptomatic.

Dr. Montalbano ori ginall y

indicated to claimant' s counsel that since the claimant was "asymptomatic prior to motor-vehicle
accidents ... It is my opinion that the etiology of his symptomatology would be related to that
motor vehicle accident. " Cl. Ex. 17, p. 576; R., p. 160. However, after reviewing the September
and October 2009 medical records, Dr. Montalbano changed his opin ion and concluded that
claimant " was symptomatic prior to the work related injury of 10/04/2009 [sic] and, therefore, l
would attributed the etiology of his symptomatology to be related to a degenerative condition."

Cl. Ex. 21 , P. 640a.
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In the 2018 Order, the Commission considered the medical records and opinions of the
providers regarding the September 9 and October 5, 2009 notes and found that "the evidence
does not establish that the back pain or low back pain with which Claimant presented on those
occasions was simply a manifestation of a systemic illness such as the flu." 2018 Order, 171 , R ..
p. 170. The Commission opined that Dr. Montalbano 's reasoning, i.e., that the medications
prescribed were typically prescribed for musculoskeletal complaints and that there was no
documentation of the flu in the notes, was more persuasive than Dr. Hammond's opinion. 2018
Order, 1 72, R., p. 171.
In so doing, the Commission specifically rejected the opm1ons set forth in PA
McCready's January 19, 2016 check the box questionnaire prepared by claimant' s counsel. See,
Cl. Ex. 6, p. 348. PA McCready was asked to fi ll out this check the box questionnaire by
claimant's counsel in response to a six-page letter dated November 5, 2015 which on ly
summarized the medical records and claimant's counsel's view of the evidence. CL Ex. 6, pp.
349-354.

The Commission found that the opinions to which PA McCready agreed were vague

and not especially probative of causation, a conclusion supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Id. , at R. pp. 170-1 71. An examination of propositions to which PA McCready agreed
establishes that he did not opine that the claimant' s October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident
caused the need for the claimant' s subsequent low back treatment. Cl. Ex. 6, p. 348.
The Commission also analyzed and considered whether and to what extent claimant
suffered from low back complaints following his October 5, 2009 accident. The Commission
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succinctly stated how the resolution of this issue would affect its determination of causation:
Based on the medical opinions that have been adduced, if claimant's low back
complaints following the 2009 accident were persistent and unrelenting, it would
be rather easy to conclude that the subject accident must have aggravated
Claimant's pre-existing low back disease; objective findings consistent with an
accident caused an aggravation of a pre-existing condition could be con-elated
with the medical history of new and unrelenting back in lower extremity
symptoms since the accident to support the conclusion that the accident caused
permanent injury to Claimant's low back. On the other hand, if the evidence is
more susceptible of a conclusion that Claimant did not present with persistent low
back complaints following the subject accident until the late fall of 2011 , then it
becomes much more difficult to conclude that the subject accident is implicated in
the cause of Claimant's low back condition. The evidence on this issue is
conflicting but, as developed below, the record offers less support to the
proposition that claimant suffered from persistent and unrelenting low back pain
since the October 5, 2009 MVA , and more support to the proposition that his low
back complaints began, in earnest, in late 2011.
2018 Order ,r 73, R. , pp. 171-172 (emphasis added).
The outcome of thi s issue is significant because Dr. Reedy' s opined that the claimant's
motor vehicle accident led to "persistent unrelenting pain in the back and leg" and therefore the
"motor vehicle accident flared up his pre-existing condition" such that it is " directly related to
the need for surgery." Cl. Ex. 5, p. 186. Dr. Montalbano, on the other hand, testified in his
deposition that the claimant' s post-accident medical records did not establish persistent,
unrelenting low back pain; therefore, he opined that the claimant's motor vehicle accident on ly
temporarily aggravated his pre-existing low back condition. 2018 Order,

,r 57, R., p.

162 (citing

Montalbano depo., pp. 30, L. 23 - p. 31 , L. 19; p. 32, L. 11 - p. 37, L. 3)
The Commission acknowledged that the claimant testified that he suffered from low back
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and lower extremity numbness unremittingly since his motor vehicle accident of October 6,

2009. 2018 Order,

1 74,

at R. , p. 172. (citing Clmt. depo., p. 33, II. 11-22; HT 95, II. 13-17.)

While both Dr. Reedy and the claimant may honestly have believed that the claimant
consistently complained of low back and lower extremity numbness and pain following his
accident, the Commission' s review of the claimant' s medical records establishes otherwise.
The Commission found that the claimant' s post-accident medical records generated
fo llowing his accident until the late fall of 2011 "contain an equal number of records in which
claimant specifically denied low back/lower extremity symptoms which reference and examine
the low back and lower extremities which turned up nothing on toward." 2018 Order, 1 74, R. , p.

172.

The Commission also correctly noted that on the several occasions when claimant

complained of back and low back discomfort following the motor veh icle accident, the onset of
these problems was not related to his accident but was described as being of a more recent origin.
Id. , at R., p. 173. There is substantial and competent evidence to support these findings.

Claimant' s medical records demonstrate that he did not have "persistent unrelenting" low
back and leg pain after his accident. In the months follow ing hi s accident, claimant repeatedly
denied having low back pain as documented by the records from GFHC (November 4,
November 16, November 30, and December 11 , 2009). Cl. Ex. 3, pp. 196, 206, 208 and 2 1 I.
The claimant first reported having back pain to his personal physician on June 21. 2010. At that
time, he reported that he had back pain "which is new" and located in his mid-right back. Id. at
p. 225. On July 21, 2010, he reported having mid back pain of one-month duration. Id. at p. 231 .
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Most significantly, on December 1, 2011, claimant informed Mr. McCready that he was
suffering from radiating lumbar pain that began "two weeks ago." Id. at p. 288 (emphasis
added). Claimant said the onset was gradual without a clear precipitating event. Id. (emphasis
added). In his Opening Brief, claimant' s counsel tries to challenge the veracity and reliability of
his personal physician' s medical records from GFHC.

Opening Brie±: pp. 28-30.

Despite

claimant's arguments, these objective medical records document occasional low back pain that
became more serious without a clear precipitating event in the fall of 2011.
Moreover, the Commission relied on claimant's failure to document any low back pain
on his pain diagram or in his medical questionnaire to Dr. Harri s in July 20 l 0, including that he
specifically denied that he had continuing leg pain when examined by Dr. Harris. 2018 Order, 1
77, R. 175; Cl. Ex. 20, pp. 603, 629-630. The Commission also noted that Dr. Reedy released
the claimant from his care once he was medically stable following his cervical fusion rather than
treating his low back condition which claimant alleges Dr. Reedy felt required medical
treatment. 2018 Order, 176, R., p. 176.
Claimant's attempt to explain the failure of his medical records to document complaints
of persistent unrelenting low back pain because it was his practice to on ly reference his most
predominant complaints to his treating physicians was rejected by the Commission. 2018 Order,
~

75, R., pp. 173- 175.

The Commission provided numerous examples where the claimant

complained of multiple issues to his therapists. It is apparent from a review of the entirety of the
claimant's medical records that he complained of multiple issues to various physicians, including
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complaints of back pain to physicians who were not his "back" doctor. The most significant
complaint, which was the most damning to his claim, was his complaint of a new onset of low
back pain in 2011 to his personal physician that he did not attribute to his motor vehicle accident
or any other precipitating event.
Ultimately, based upon the testimony of Dr. Montalbano and the Commission's review of
claimant's medical records, the Commission properly concluded based upon the evidence of
record noted above that:
The record better supports the proposition that Claimant suffered from periodic.
but not unrelenting, low back and lower extremity discomfort between October 6,
2009 and the late fall of201 l , just as he suffered from periodic bouts of low back
pain in the years prior to October 6, 2009. The opinions of Dr. Reedy, Dr.
Hammond and Dr. Hajjar are al l premised on the assumption that Claimant's low
back symptomatology increase precipitously following the industrial accident. ...
As described by Drs. Hammond, Montalbano and Reedy, Claimant's lumbar
spine films demonstrate degenerative findings with no clear evidence of an acute
injury which could be related to the subject accident. For those reasons, Claimant
failed to establish that his low back condition is causally related to the subject
accident.
2018 Order ,r 77, R. , pp. 175-176.
In his Opening Brief, claimant merely rehashes his arguments previously presented to
and rejected by the Commission. As this Court stated in Hartgrave v. City of Twin Falls, 163
Idaho 347,4 13 P.3d 747, 757 (2018):
"Distilling [claimant's) arguments ultimately reveals a request for this Court to
employ a de novo standard of review. Yet, that is not the proper standard of
review at this juncture. E.g. , Serrano, 157 Idaho at 3 17, 336 P.3d at 250 (" [T]his
Court does not 'conduct a de novo review of the evidence or consider whether it
would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented.' "
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(quoting Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 565, 130 P.3d 1097,
1103 (2006) ).
Claimant's counsel is asking this Court to do the same thing he did in Hartgrave, conduct a de
novo review of the evidence. As in Hartgrave, this Court should affirm the Commission's ruli ng
that the claimant's low back condition is not compensable.

B.
There is Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support The
Commission's Finding That Claimant Suffered a 40% Disability Inclusive of
His Impairment due to his 2009 and 2013 Accidents.
I.

Claimant Failed to Meet His Burden of Proving He Is Totally and Permanently
Disabled

The claimant's argument that he is totally and permanently disabled is based exclusively
on the fact that he is an older worker and ignores that he remains gainfully employed by
Employer. His argument was rejected by the Commission because has continued to work in his
time of injury job for Employer since 2009 at increasing pay despite his inj uries. The
Commission properly found that Employer was not a "sympathetic employer" nor was his
continued employment due to super human effort. More importantly, the Commission gave the
claimant every benefit of the doubt, including using an FCE that took into account claimant's
significant non-industrial low back condition, and found that he suffered a 40% disability
inclusive of his impairment. Critical to the Commission ' s finding was that the claimant was
performing an actual job that is likely to continue, that he is an older worker, and that he has
suffered no wage loss. Contrary to claimant's assertions in his Opening Briet: the Commission ' s
find ings are not clearly erroneous as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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The Commission properly noted that the claimant bears the burden of proving that he has
suffered disability in excess of his impairment, which is a question of fact. Boley v State

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 289 P.2d 854 (1997); R., p. 185.

The

Commission noted that test for detem1ining whether a claimant has permanent disability in
excess of impairment is whether the impairment taken in conjunction with nonmedical factors
has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment. Greybill v. Swift & Co. , 115 Idaho
293, 766 P.2d 763 (1988); R., p. 185.
A claimant falls within the "odd-lot" category of total permanent disability if he was so
injured that he can only perform services which are "so limited in quality, dependabi li ty, or
quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist." Arnold v. Splendid Bakery, 88
Idaho 455, 463, 401 P.2d 271 , 276 (1965) (citing Crawford v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 526, 307 P.2d
229 (1957)); Lyons v. Industrial Special lndem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 406, 565 P.2d 1360, 1363
(1977). There are three ways for an injured worker to show they are an odd-lot worker: (I) by
showing they have attempted other work without success; (2) by showing that they or vocational
counselors have sought other suitable work but it was not available; and/or (3) by showing that
any effort to find suitable work would be futile. Hamilton v. Ted Beamis logging & Constr ..
127 ldaho 221, 224, 899 P.2d 434, 437 (1995).
Once a claimant has satisfied his burden of proving a prima facie case of odd-lot status,
the burden shifts to the employer to show "there is an actual job with in a reasonable distance
from [Claimant's] home which he is able to perfonn or for which he can be trained" and that he
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"has a reasonable opportunity to be employed at that job." Lyons. 98 Idaho at 407, 565 P.2d at
1364.

In the present case the Commission used the claimant' s FCE as a guide to evaluating hi s
disability from all causes combined over defendants' objection that the FCE was unreliable. the
claimant admitted he could work in excess of these capabilities, the restrictions on the FCE were
based in large part upon the claimant's non-compensable low back injury and the claimant's
treating physicians had all released the claimant to return to work without restriction. 2018
Order, ,i 105, R. , p. 191. The Commission' s decision to use the FCE as the benchmark for his
physical restrictions clearly benefited claimant especially since claimant's main disabling
condition at the time of his hearing was his low back, which the Commission found was not
compensable.
At hearing, claimant testified that both sitting and standing causes pain in his low back
and numbness down his legs. Tr., p. 120, II. 1-24. His low back pain causes him difficulty
getting up and walking from a seated position. Tr., p. 121 , 11. 4-23. As a result, he fee ls like he
has trouble with his balance and falls over. Id. His low back affects his ability to drive long
distances that requires him to stop all the time. Id. His low back limits his walking to a quarter of
a mile. If he walks up and down it causes additional low back pain. Tr. , p.122, JI. 3-18. His low
back pain requires him to use a cane occasionally. Id. at II. 19-25. He was very clear that it was
his low back condition and not his knee that causes him to use a cane.

Tr., p. 123 11. 1-3.

Claimant also testified that assuming he had no problems with his left shoulder. left elbow or
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right knee he would still have difficulty lifting things off of the floor due to his low back. Id. at
II. 4-9. At the time of his FCE the Claimant' s primary diagnosis was "lumbar spine injury." Cl.
Ex. 23, p. 646. The therapist who performed the FCE detem1ined that the Claimant's low back
condition affected the Claimant's functional ability to walk, lift from waist to floor, lift and
carry, forward bend, stand and sit. Id. at p. 647. Yet the Commission considered the FCE as
setting forth his restrictions for purposes of evaluating his disability.
The Commission also considered the claimant's transferable skills including his
demonstrated ability to assume responsibility for the day-to-day operation of a large farm with
unique soil characteristics. 2018 Order,

iJ 107, R., p.

191. The Commission rejected Dr. Collins'

opinion that the claimant's ability to continue to work for seven (7) years following his first
industrial accident was due to superhuman effort and/or that the employer was a "sympathetic
employer." The Commission noted, consistent with the testimony, that claimant can delegate
work as necessary and may take longer to perform certain work activities but his work is not
through "superhuman effort." 2018 Order, iJ 111, R. , p. 193. The Commission also rejected Dr.
Collins' opinions that employer was "sympathetic" because his job that he performs is real and
his services are valuable, even essential, to Employer' s business. 2018 Order,

iJ 112, R., p.

194.

As a result of claimant's continued employment since 2009 with significant annual earnings
increases, the Commission found that defendants satisfied their burden of rebutting a prima.facie
case of odd lot status. 2018 Order, iJ 113, R., p. 195.
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2. The Commission 's Finding That the Claimant has a 40% Disability is Supported by
Substantial and Competent Evidence

In its assessment of the claimant's disability, the Commission considered the claimant's
age as a non.medical factor. While Idaho Code §72-430 includes age among the nonmedical
factors to be considered by the Commission in evaluating disability, the statute does not require
the Commission to award higher disability to older workers. The Commission determined that
the claimant's age is a factor that affected his disability but noted that due to his long tenure and
importance to the operation of Employer' s farm, his current employment tended towards a lower
disability assessment. 2018 Order, 1114, R., pp. 195-196.
The Commission considered that while the claimant' s current employment is likely to
continue at his current or higher wage he has still lost access to a " large swath of his pre-injury
labor market, thus constraining his employment options now and in the future, shou ld he, for
whatever reason, lose his current job." 2018 Order, 1 115, R., p. 196. As a result, they awarded
the claimant 40% disability inclusive of impairment. Id.

Despite claimant's counsel's

representations in his Opening Brief that the Commission erred in finding that the claimant could
continue working at Employer' s farm until his retirement, claimant' s testimony that he contacted
Social Security within one year of the hearing to determine how much he would receive in
retirement benefits proves that the claimant was considering retirement prior to hearing. Tr.. p.
145, l. 9 - p. 146, 1. 1. Claimant also testified that he intended to work as Jong as Employer has a
job available for him. Tr., p. 163, LL 19-22. The fact that the claimant is still working for
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Employer nine years following his initial industrial accident establishes that his employment is
likely to continue as long as he is able to work and Employer has work available for him.

It is certainly reasonable that based upon the fact that claimant has been continuously
employed in his time of injury position since 2009, has received increases in his wages over
several years since his accident and the likelihood of his continued employment until he decides
to retire that claimant has suffered no disability in excess of his impaim1ent. The Commission
acknowledged this possible scenario in its Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Modification
and Consolidation. R., p. 285. Based upon the claimant's argument to this Court in his Opening
Brief that his labor market consists solely of his current job, since he is still employed in this job
he has no disability beyond his impairment. Yet, the Commission gave the claimant the benefit
of the doubt and awarded 40% disability. Assuming the claimant lost his job, Mr. Jordan
identified other employers in his area that would benefit from the claimant' s unique expertise in
irrigating the lands around Bruneau; therefore, his labor market is not limited to his current job.

3.

Claimant 's Post-Award Motions Were Properly Denied

Claimant filed several, often contradictory, motions following the Commission's 2018
Order (hereinafter "post-award motions"). In support of his post-award motions, he offered new
evidence, including claimant' s affidavit stating that his income was lower in 2017 than 2016 and
that he suffered a new accident and injury to his left knee in June 2017 whil e working for
employer. R., pp. 209-216. Claimant argued that his recent accident of June 7, 2017 and hi s
income reduction in 2017 constitutes new evidence which wants a review of the Commission· s
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2018 Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718 and/or 72-719. He also asked the Commission to
consolidate his 2017 claim with his 2009 and 2013 claims. R. , pp. 230-232. The Commission
properly denied all of the claimant' s post-award motions. R. , pp. 279-302.
In its order denying claimant' s post-award motions, the Comm ission rejected claimant' s
argument that his current employment "punishes" claimant for continuing to work in his time of
injury position. The Commission correctly concluded that the workers compensation system did
what it was intended to do, pay income and medical benefits supporting his recovery and return
to gainful employment. R., p. 284.
The Commission also rejected the claimant' s claim that his 2017 drop in earnings
undercut one of the bases of the Commission's decision to award him a 40% disability. Thi s
was due, in part, to the claimant' s failure to prove that his drop in earnings was caused by any
limitations due to his 2009 or 2013 injuries. It was also due to the fact that the Commission
considered the potential that he would lose employment when it awarded him a 40% disability
when, based upon the fact of his continued employment and likely employment until he decides
to retire, they could have awarded him no disability. R., pp. 284-285.
The Commission also properly denied claimant' s Motion for Modification pursuant to
Idaho Code §72-719.

The two grounds for his motion were: (1) that Claimant suffered a

"significant and substantial change in the nature or extent of his disablement" and (2) to correct a
manifest injustice. With regard to the alleged manifest injustice, the claimant argued that to
avoid a manifest injustice the record must be reopened to allow consideration of claimant's
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changed circumstances, his 2017 knee injury and his decreased earnings in 2017. R. , 292. This
motion was properly denied by the Commission because the claimant's 2017 claim was not part
of these proceedings as it was a new, separate claim, and he offered no evidence of a nexus
between his decreased earnings and his 2009 and 2013 injuries.
Idaho Code §72-719 allows the Commission to modify an award only if there is a
"[c]hange in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement." 1.C. § 72-719( 1)(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court has made the claimant's burden of establishi ng a change in condition
under LC.§ 72-719(1)(a) clear:
When a Claimant applies for modification of an award due to a change in
condition under LC. § 72-719(a), the Claimant bears the burden of showing
a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep't o/Corr., 121 Idaho 680, 681 , 827
P.2d 693, 694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391
(1937)). The Claimant is "required to make a showing before the
Commission that he had an increased level of impairment, and to establish
with reasonable medical probability the existence of a causal relationship
between the change in condition and the initial accident and injury."
Matthews, 121 Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d at 694-95 (internal citations
omitted).

Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co. , 152 Idaho 196, 201 268 P.3d 464, 469 (2012) (emphasi s
added). Therefore, it is clear that Claimant must establish with reasonable medical probability
the existence of a causal relationship between the change of condition/disablement and his 2009
and 2013 accidents/injuries.
Claimant ignored Supreme Court precedent set forth in Magee because he based his
change in condition argument upon a 2017 injury to his left knee. Claimant must establish with
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reasonable medical probability the existence of a causal relationship between the change of
condition/d isablement and his 2009 and 20 13 injuries. Claimant offered no proof, facts or other
argument as required by this Court in Magee. Claimant offered no evidence or facts that hi s 20 17
left knee injury was related to his 2009 or 2013 accidents/injuries. The Commission noted that
since claimant conceded that his motion was not premised on any change in the nature or ex tent
of his physical injuries related to his 2009 and 2013 accidents, his motion was denied. R., p. 332.
C laimant also argued that the restrictions attributable to his 20 17 left knee injury support
hi s claim that he is totally and permanently disabled ; therefore his 2017 claim should be
consolidated with his 2009 and 2013 claims. This argument is frivolous and directly contradicts
his representations to this Court that he was totally and permanentl y disabled based upon hi s
2009 and 2013 injuries. The Commission properly rejected claimant's motion to reopen. R.. pp.
332-333.

C.
The Commission's Decision to Draft The 2018 Order Was A Proper
Exercise of Its Power Under Idaho Code §72-506, Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion and Did Not Violate Claimant's Due Process Rights
Under Idaho's statutory scheme, the Commission is the fina l arbiter of contested
worker's compensation claims in Idaho. Relying on ldaho Code §72-506, this Court has made it
clear that any findings or awards are not deemed final unti l they have been approved and/or
confirmed by the Commission. Zapata v. JR. Simplot Company, 132 Idaho 5 13, 516. 975 P.2d
11 78, 1181 (1999). Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-506(2), any find ings of fact made by a referee
are merely recommendations to the Commission which, upon review, the Commission could
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either adopt or enter its own findings. Lorca-Merono v. Yokes Washington Foods. inc.. 137
Idaho 446, 451, 50 P.3d 461 , 466 (2002); see also Idaho Code §72-717. "The Commission need
not explain why it did not adopt certain findings recommended by the referee." id. Furthermore.
ultimately the Commission decides what weight should be given to the facts and conclusions
drawn from those facts. Zapata, 132 Idaho at 515, 978 P.2d at 1180.
In the present case, Referee Powers presided over the hearing. Unfortunately, Referee
Powers faced a significant case backlog that would result in a delay of the decision. Therefore.
he did not prepare recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Commission's
review. Over the objections of the parties, the Commission detennined that its "obligation to
manage our docket to promote timely decisions supports assignment of this matter to the
Commission." R. , p . 133. The Commission has the authority to use its discretion to manage its
docket and decide the case based upon the record before it, including the hearing transcript.
Compare, Van Heukelom v. Pine Crest Psychiatric Center. 160 Idaho 898, 900, 684 P.2d 300,
302 (1984) (Commission' s failure to have a transcript of the proceedings before it rendered its
decision denied claimant's due process rights). It is immaterial that the referee did not prepare
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law because the Commission could have
disregarded them and reached its own findings and conclusions as provided by Idaho Code §§72506 and 72-7 17.
While former Justice Jim Jones, in a concurring opinion, was critical of the
Commission' s decision not to adopt the referee' s recommendations and issuing their own
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findings of fact, conclusions of law and order; he felt the Commission should provide discussion
in future cases as to why it made a determination to discard the referee ' s recommendation and
issue its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply.

Inc. , 159 Idaho 324, 330, 360 P.3d 333, 339 (2015). In this case, the Commission stated the
rationale for its decision to write its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, i.e.,
management of its docket to promote timely decisions. R. , p. 133.
The Commission also noted that the outcome of the case did not tum on an assessment of
the claimant's observational credibility. Id. This Court has stated that observational credibility
"goes to the demeanor of the appellant on the witness stand" and it "requires that the
Commission actually be present for the hearing" in order to judge it. Painter v. Potlatch
Corporation, 138 Idaho 309, 313, 63 P.3d 435, 439 (2003).

In the present case, the claimant's

observational credibility was not an issue. Claimant testified extensively to his perceived
limitations due to the injuries he suffered in his motor vehicle accident and his 2013 right knee
injury. See, TR.,, pp. 99-101; 111-119. In its 2018 Order, the Commission made no mention of
the claimant' s credibility as it related to his demeanor. In fact, no one disputed that the claimant
suffered from a significant low back condition at the time of the hearing; the only dispute was
whether this condition was caused by his 2009 accident a hotly contested and disputed issue.
On the other hand, this Court has held that the Commission may judge a claimant' s
substantive credibility. Painter, 138 Idaho at 313, 63 P.3d at 439. Substantive credibility "may
be judged on the grounds of numerous inaccuracies or conflicting facts and does not require the
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presence of the commission at hearing. ,. Id. In its 2018 Order, the Commission analyzed the
c laimant's substantive credibility by noting that his medical records contradicted his testimony
that he had unrelenting low back pain since his 2009 accident and that it was hi s practice to only
address his most predominant complaint with his treating physicians. 20 18 Order,

,r,r 74-75 ; R ..

pp. 172-175. As is shown above, there is substantial and competent evidence to suppo11 the
Commission's findings that claimant failed to prove his low back condition was caused by his
2009 accident.
The Commission did not deny the claimant's due process rights because he had an
opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. Elias-Cruz v.

Idaho Dep 't of Transp .. 153 Idaho 2000, 2004, 280 P.3d 703, 707 (2012).

The claimant was

given notice of the issues to be decided at hearing, offered documentary evidence, offered his
client's and his experts' testimony, briefed the issues and filed post-hearing motions. A review of
the 2018 Order indicates that the Commission conducted an exhaustive review of the extensive
documentary exhibits and the witness testimony to reach its ultimate findings of fact and
conclusions of law that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thus. the
Commission did not deny the claimant his due process rights.

D.
The Commission
Reaching Its 2018 Order

Properly

Considered

Admitted

Evidence in

Claimant alleges that the Commission considered two pages of allegedly excluded
evidence in reaching its 2018 Order, specificall y pages 65 and 115 of claimant's Exhibit 3 that
document claimant's complaints of long standing low back pain in 2004 and 2007. However. an
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examination of the Commission's 2018 Order and the admitted exhibits demonstrate that
references to the treatment reflected in these records were already admitted into evidence and.
alternatively, the reference to these two pages by the Commission constitutes harmless error.
The claimant in his Rule 10 Disclosure disclosed his intent to offer treatment records
from GFHC between 2001 and his October 5, 2009 accident. R. , p. 49; Cl. Ex. 3. Defendants in
their Rule IO Disclosure specifically reserved "the right to introduce any exhibit(s) offered by
any other party." R., p. 46. At the start of the hearing, claimant's counsel asked to withdraw
pages 46 through 115 of Exhibit 3. Tr., p. 8, II. 12- 16. However, defendants' counsel moved for
admission of these pages because they were relevant and mentioned in an expert report. Tr., p.
13, LI. 16 - 18. Ultimately, the referee excluded these relevant exhibits from the record. R., p.
73.
Claimant's counsel, however, failed to move for exclusion of all of the exhibits that
documented the claimant's complaints of long standing low back problems on May 21, 2007 as
reflected on page 115 of claimant's Exhibit 3. As a result, the substance of this treatment note
was admitted into evidence in claimant' s Exhibit 6 page 349 and Exhibit 20 at pages 60 I and
629. In its 2018 Order, the Commission noted that claimant's counsel quoted this treatment note
in a letter to Vernon McCready requesting an opinion regarding causation on November 5, 2015
and that Dr. Harris relied upon this treatment note in his expert report regarding causation. R. , p.
129, fnl; See, Cl. Ex. 6, p. 349; Cl. Ex. 20, pp. 601 and 629. As a result, the May 21, 2007
treatment note documenting claimant's complaints involving the right hip and SI region for over
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two years without recent trauma, which claimant' s counsel referenced in one of claimant's
exhibits that was admitted into evidence, was properly admitted into evidence and could be
relied upon by the Commission in reaching its 2018 Order.
The records claimant initially intended to offer as evidence but later withdrew at the time
of hearing referenced the low back symptoms the claimant's counsel acknowledged that claimant
had been experiencing prior to his motor vehicle accident. See, Cl. Ex. 6, p.635. Dr. Harris and
Vernon McCready relied upon them in preparing causation opinions.

These records were

referenced in exhibits that were admitted into evidence. The only reason claimant's cow1sel
sought to exclude their admission at the time of hearing was because he knev,, they contained
evidence documenting his client's long-standing low back issues. To the extent the Court
believes the Commission erred in considering these two pages, claimant' s counsel led the
Commission into error.
More importantly, claimant's counsel's last-minute attempt to exclude this evidence
while referencing the medical treatment in other admitted exhibits and then claiming that the
Commission improperly considered the substance of these med ical records sets a dangerous
precedent in workers compensation cases. Practitioners in workers compensation often give
medical records to doctors when soliciting causation opinions. Surety gave these records to Drs.
Harris and Montalbano and claimant' s counsel referenced this record in his letter to PA
Mccready. These records were relevant and claimant gave his notice of intent to seek their
admission at the hearing.

Claimant's decision to attempt to exclude these exhibits over
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defendants' objection without removing any reference to the substance of these records in other
admitted exhibits invited any alleged error by the Commission in considering these treatment
records.
The Commission's decision to admit medical records into evidence is a matter of
d iscretion. Fonseca v. Corral Agric., Inc. , 156 Idaho 142, 149, 321 P.3d 692, 699 (2014).
Whether to exclude or admit evidence in worker's compensation cases is precisely the kind of the
decision subject to the Commission's discretion. Hagler v. Micron Tech .. Inc.. 118 Idaho 596,
598, 798 P.2d 55, 57 (1990). Pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard of review, this Court
"will not supplant the views" of the Commission with its own. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,
875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (201 1). The Commission's decision to consider and thus "admit" the
actual medical records documenting medical treatment referenced in other admitted exhibits is
not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, even if this Court considers the Commission's consideration of the two pages of
medical records to be in error, the error is harmless. T his Court will not reverse the decision of
the Commission when evidentiary issues are harmless. Hagler, 118 Idaho at 599, 788 P .2d at 58.
Here the Commission acknowledged that it was undisputed that the claimant had pre-existing
degenerative disease of his lumbar spine and that the issue was whether the motor vehicle
accident in 2009 caused permanent injury to his lumbar spine such that his need for medical
treatment in 2016 was related to said accident. 2018 Order, ,i 68, R., p. 168. The Commission
acknowledged that exclusion of these two records referencing period ic low back pain "would not
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change any aspect of the Commission' s decision; as noted, there is other evidence of record
which establishes that Claimant did have some pre-injury low back symptoms." 2018 Order, fn
1, R., p. 130. Since there were references to the claimant's pre-accident treatment for low back
symptoms that had been long-standing, which were otherwise admitted and are of record, the
Commission's consideration of the 2004 and May 2 1, 2007 treatment notes is harmless.

E.

The Claimant Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees

Idaho Code § 72-804 permits an award of attorneys ' fees in three limited circumstances:
(1) where a Surety contests a claim without reasonable grounds; (2) when the Surety
unreasonably delays or denies payment of benefits fo llowing receipt of a written claim for
compensation; or (3) the Surety discontinues payment of benefits without reasonable grounds.
Defendants have prevailed on each and every issue in this case, the Commission found they
properly denied benefits for claimant's low back and they paid all medical and income benefits
while promoting claimant's return to continued employment. Claimant's claim for attorney' s
fees is frivolous.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Commission's findings that claimant failed to prove that his
low back condition was caused by his 2009 accident, the c laimant failed to prove that he is
totally and permanently disabled and that claimant suffers from a 40% disability as they are
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

This Court should reject the claimant's

argument that the Commission abused its discretion and/or denied him due process by deciding
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this case without a referee' s recommended deci sion. This Court should also reject claimant' s
argument that the Commission considered evidence that was not properly in the record. Fi nally.
the Court should deny claimant' s claim for attorney fees.
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Dated this )! day of December, 2018.
A UGUSTINE LAWOFFICES.

PLLC

By:
. Aug stine - Of the Fi rm
or Employer/Surety - Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the) \1~y of December, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the followi ng persons in the manner indicated
below:

L. Clyel Berry

L u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid

STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR

__Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
__Telecopy

PO Box 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303

Attorneys for Claimant-Appellant
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